The Calculus of Indifference: The economic logic of blatant disregard for human lives and authoritarian brinkmanship

Many observers seem genuinely surprised that the Iranian regime is showing no sign of blinking in its high-stakes game of chicken with the US. They also ask: why are there no visible civil defense preparations nor civilian education campaigns despite the mounting threats of confrontation with the world's strongest army? Others note Donald Trump’s own reported surprise: with all the military posturing and credible threats, why does the Iranian government display no willingness to compromise or back down? And still others express astonishment at Trump’s apparent hesitation to launch military action against Iran, even after significant buildup and rhetoric of imminent war: why would he refuse to risk even a single American life in the pursuit of regime change in Iran? 

These reactions, while understandable on the surface, reveal a deeper misapprehension. Viewed through the lens of human rights declarations or moral outrage alone, the regime's calculus appears inexplicable: why are some lives worth more than others? However, the explanation is rather economic and institutional: in a political system where elections are theatrical, and votes carry no real weight, human lives carry little weight either. Civilian lives are cheap, not because the rulers are inherently callous (though some undoubtedly are), but because the fate of those in power is decoupled from the fate of those they rule. When political survival does not hinge on accountability, the human cost of brinkmanship becomes an externality the regime can readily ignore. Evidence? Just look at how comfortably Iranian authorities talk about the human toll of the recent uprising in Iran. 

The same logic illuminates Trump's caution. A leader in a functioning democracy operates under constraints where the loss of American lives would impose immediate political costs in the form of electoral backlash, eroded legitimacy, and fractured coalitions. The regime in Tehran faces no such constraint. Its calculus is one of raw power preservation, untempered by mechanisms that make civilian (or even military) deaths politically expensive.

This disconnect is not accidental; it is the predictable outcome of institutional design or the lack thereof. The real question, then, is not why the regime behaves this way, but how any political order can be structured to ensure that human lives matter not merely as rhetoric in international charters or lofty preambles, but as costly realities for those who wield coercive power.

Symbolic declarations of adherence to human rights offer no reliable safeguard. Words on paper do not constrain ambitions of arbitrary power; incentives do. The path to making human lives truly expensive lies in constitutional design: a system where power is divided, checked, and made periodically removable through genuine contestation. Healthy rotation of elites, enforced by free elections embedded within a broader framework of limited government, rule of law, separation of powers, and independent judicial oversight, creates the accountability that aligns rulers' interests with the welfare of the ruled.

In such a system, reckless escalation becomes prohibitively costly, not because leaders suddenly become more virtuous, but because ignoring the human toll threatens their own tenure. This is the via negativa of good governance and democracy: design institutions that penalize political malpractice and disregard for life, rather than relying on perpetual moral exhortation or benevolence.

Iran's tragic history underscores the urgency of this lesson. Without robust constraints on arbitrary power, regimes, be they revolutionary, republican, or monarchist, drift toward treating lives as expendable currency in the pursuit of dominance. The current impasse is but one symptom of that deeper institutional failure. As we contemplate Iran's future, let us resist the temptation of quick fixes or moralistic appeals. The enduring solution resides in patient institution-building: one that imposes real costs on those who would gamble with others' lives. Only then can human dignity move from aspiration to enforceable reality.

Republicanism vs. Monarchism: A False Dichotomy

The tragic events of January 2026 in Iran have once again thrust the question of the country's future political order to the forefront. As someone who has followed these debates from afar and with a very heavy heart, I find the emerging polarization between monarchists and republicans somewhat disheartening. The two camps appear locked in mutual incomprehension, each viewing the other not merely as mistaken but as treacherous. This encampment strikes me as a false dichotomy, one that distracts from the far more consequential choice: not the label attached to the head of the state, but the presence (or absence) of robust constitutional constraints on power.

A constitutional liberal democracy can take the form of either a republic or a monarchy. For example, the United Kingdom's constitutional monarchy has long preserved individual liberties, the rule of law, and accountable government far more effectively than many self-proclaimed republics. The same institutional logic can apply in reverse. What matters is not whether the constitutional arrangement has the label of monarchy or republic, but whether power is constrained by enduring principles and mechanisms that prevent its arbitrary exercise.

One of the most frustrating aspects of the current discourse is the recurring misconception that attaching the word "democracy” or “republic” to a system automatically immunizes it against authoritarian drift. We have seen this illusion play out repeatedly. Elections can be held under the most repressive regimes, often serving as theatrical tools to purge rivals or manufacture legitimacy. In Iran’s fragile institutional context, the naive faith in form over substance risks repeating past tragedies. If we are serious about avoiding descent into yet another cycle of despotism, the debate should center on a handful of non-negotiable elements. Their presence defines a functioning constitutional order; their absence condemns any regime, be it monarchical or republican, to authoritarianism:

• Limited government, with powers enumerated very restrictively. What the state is forbidden from doing is as vital as what it is permitted to do. Unlimited authority, whatever its source, invites abuse.

• The rule of law and equality before the law

• Separation of powers coupled with an effective checks and balances system, ensuring that power counters power and no single branch or person can dominate.

• An independent judiciary, ideally vested with judicial review, serving as the ultimate arbiter in disputes between citizens, citizens and the state, and among governmental branches.

• Free elections that render officials removable by the ballot box rather than by force. I have long viewed elections through a via negativa lens; not primarily as mechanisms to select the best and brightest, but as devices to rid the polity or the government of the worst. 

A symbolic or ceremonial monarchy, stripped of substantive political power, poses little inherent threat and may even offer benefits. In the Burkean tradition, such an institution can serve as a living link to historical continuity, embodying accumulated wisdom and national identity while subordinating itself to constitutional norms and democratic accountability. It stitches past to present, tempering radical impulses with a measure of stability and restraint; qualities that, unfortunately, Iran has sorely lacked.

That said, any monarchy that exercises more than symbolic authority must be rigorously subjected to the same constitutional disciplines outlined above. In a society with weak democratic traditions and institutions, the risks of unchecked power, hereditary or otherwise, are simply too great. No public authority should wield even an epsilon of coercive power without commensurate accountability. History teaches us that good intentions or appeals to tradition provide no reliable safeguard against the temptations of absolutism.

In the end, the monarchist-republican divide is a distraction from the deeper imperative: building a constitutional architecture that tames power itself. Whether the head of state wears a crown or emerges from the ballot box is secondary. What endures is the framework that constrains it. Without that, Iran risks exchanging one form of authoritarianism for another.

The Folly of Dutch Tax Reforms

I typically steer clear of politics, but as someone who has come to deeply love the Netherlands and its people, when I see a nation I cherish so much heading down a troubling path, silence sounds like a betrayal. 

That is why I have to speak out against the proposed/ongoing reforms to the Box 3 tax system, specifically the actual returns in Box 3, which introduce a 36% tax on actual returns, including unrealized capital gains. This reform is not just misguided, it is arguably more flawed than the previous system of taxing fictitious returns, which the Dutch Supreme Court rightly struck down for violating human rights and EU law. 

This bill, approved by the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) and now awaiting Senate review, risks accelerating the very decline it claims to prevent. Here are my predictions based on the bill's implications:

Disproportionate burden on the middle-income earners: Unsophisticated middle-income earners, including everyday savers and pension holders, will bear the brunt. They lack the resources to restructure assets into exempted categories like real estate or startup shares, or to relocate abroad. Meanwhile, the wealthy and sophisticated can easily evade it through tax planning, offshore structures, or emigration.

Potential liquidity issues and ensuing volatility in financial markets: By taxing unrealized gains, the system can create liquidity problems by forcing premature asset sales to cover tax bills without actual cash inflows. This is especially acute for volatile holdings where a temporary surge could trigger massive taxes, only for the prices to plummet later. 

Rise in short-termism and market volatility: The annual taxation of paper gains punishes long-term holding, incentivizing frequent trading to realize losses or defer taxes. This could make Dutch markets more volatile, as investors prioritize quick flips over stable, productive investments, ultimately harming economic stability. This will come at the cost of long-term investment. I reckon some future retirees will face serious financial stress in their retirement, compounding the challenges of an aging population and already modest retirement expectations.

No/little net increase in state revenue: Despite the intent, the government is unlikely to collect more taxes overall. Easy avoidance by the affluent, combined with a shrinking tax base from economic slowdown and investor exodus, will dwindle taxable income.

Long-term impoverishment of the nation: Over time, the above dynamics discourage investment, stifle growth, and make the country less attractive, leading to a poorer economy.

What is really worrisome to me is that if lawmakers can enact such a shortsighted policy, what other ill-conceived measures might follow? Having emigrated from Iran, a country plagued by economic mismanagement and decline, I can recognize the warning signs from afar. This piece of legislation is a step toward the kind of decline I have already witnessed in my home country, and the Netherlands deserves better.