Republicanism vs. Monarchism: A False Dichotomy

The tragic events of January 2026 in Iran have once again thrust the question of the country's future political order to the forefront. As someone who has followed these debates from afar and with a very heavy heart, I find the emerging polarization between monarchists and republicans somewhat disheartening. The two camps appear locked in mutual incomprehension, each viewing the other not merely as mistaken but as treacherous. This encampment strikes me as a false dichotomy, one that distracts from the far more consequential choice: not the label attached to the head of the state, but the presence (or absence) of robust constitutional constraints on power.

A constitutional liberal democracy can take the form of either a republic or a monarchy. For example, the United Kingdom's constitutional monarchy has long preserved individual liberties, the rule of law, and accountable government far more effectively than many self-proclaimed republics. The same institutional logic can apply in reverse. What matters is not whether the constitutional arrangement has the label of monarchy or republic, but whether power is constrained by enduring principles and mechanisms that prevent its arbitrary exercise.

One of the most frustrating aspects of the current discourse is the recurring misconception that attaching the word "democracy” or “republic” to a system automatically immunizes it against authoritarian drift. We have seen this illusion play out repeatedly. Elections can be held under the most repressive regimes, often serving as theatrical tools to purge rivals or manufacture legitimacy. In Iran’s fragile institutional context, the naive faith in form over substance risks repeating past tragedies. If we are serious about avoiding descent into yet another cycle of despotism, the debate should center on a handful of non-negotiable elements. Their presence defines a functioning constitutional order; their absence condemns any regime, be it monarchical or republican, to authoritarianism:

• Limited government, with powers enumerated very restrictively. What the state is forbidden from doing is as vital as what it is permitted to do. Unlimited authority, whatever its source, invites abuse.

• The rule of law and equality before the law

• Separation of powers coupled with an effective checks and balances system, ensuring that power counters power and no single branch or person can dominate.

• An independent judiciary, ideally vested with judicial review, serving as the ultimate arbiter in disputes between citizens, citizens and the state, and among governmental branches.

• Free elections that render officials removable by the ballot box rather than by force. I have long viewed elections through a via negativa lens; not primarily as mechanisms to select the best and brightest, but as devices to rid the polity or the government of the worst. 

A symbolic or ceremonial monarchy, stripped of substantive political power, poses little inherent threat and may even offer benefits. In the Burkean tradition, such an institution can serve as a living link to historical continuity, embodying accumulated wisdom and national identity while subordinating itself to constitutional norms and democratic accountability. It stitches past to present, tempering radical impulses with a measure of stability and restraint; qualities that, unfortunately, Iran has sorely lacked.

That said, any monarchy that exercises more than symbolic authority must be rigorously subjected to the same constitutional disciplines outlined above. In a society with weak democratic traditions and institutions, the risks of unchecked power, hereditary or otherwise, are simply too great. No public authority should wield even an epsilon of coercive power without commensurate accountability. History teaches us that good intentions or appeals to tradition provide no reliable safeguard against the temptations of absolutism.

In the end, the monarchist-republican divide is a distraction from the deeper imperative: building a constitutional architecture that tames power itself. Whether the head of state wears a crown or emerges from the ballot box is secondary. What endures is the framework that constrains it. Without that, Iran risks exchanging one form of authoritarianism for another.